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Human Rights and the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea
BERNARD H. OXMAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
The law regarding the sea, including what we would today
characterize as the municipal law of admiralty, is as old as humanity's
use of the sea. Since time immemorial, political entities have had to
define the relationship between their authority and activities at sea, and
judges have had to deal with disputes arising from such activities. But
for those who trace the origins of modem international law to the
writings of Hugo Grotius, his essay Mare Liberum establishes the law
of the sea as one of the "original" fields ofinternationallaw. It has been
the object of systematic and continuous attention by governments and
publicists ever since.
There are ancient foundations for human rights law, both interna-
tional and municipal. The natural law environment in which Grotius
worked was itself more hospitable to the idea of governmental obliga-
tions to individuals than the state-centeredpositivism that succeeded it.
But for those who regard as seminal events the French Declaration of
the Rights of Man and the American Bill of Rights, even municipal
human rights law is "younger" than the modem law of the sea, and
international human rights law younger still.
One of the ways to recognize distinct fields of law is to look for
distinct guilds of lawyers. With the disappearance of formal guilds to
guide us, this becomes a matter of perspective. Viewed from afar, all
lawyers constitute a single guild. Many lawyers would regard
"international law" as a single guild. Viewed up close, international
lawyers concerned with protecting individual rights to private property
may be perceived, and may perceive themselves, as functioning in a
different guild from international lawyers concerned with protecting
individual rights of expression.
* Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. The author served as United
States Representative to the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea and
chaired the English Language Group of the Conference Drafting Committee. The views
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There are ample objective indications that the international law of
the sea and international human rights law generally engage different
guilds of international lawyers, both practitioners and academics. As
Louis Henkin demonstrates, a scholar of uncommon ability and
perspective can transcend those differences.' With varying degrees of
success, others aspire to be "Renaissance men" of international law,
and, like the judges and bar of the International Court of Justice, not to
mention professors and students of "International Law," may be
compelled by circumstance to do so.
Specialists in one field often have a lively interest in the other. But
the gulf is real. The culprits are time and the value of acquired
knowledge and experience. There are different people teaching dif-
ferent courses, negotiating different instruments, attending different
meetings, and writing for and reading differentjournals. The explosion
of information and possibilities for communication on the Internet
suggest that increased globalizationmay be the geographic effect of the
new technology, but that the substantive effect may be the reverse. It
is likely that an expert in the law of the sea or in international human
rights law will spend more time in regular professional contact with
more foreigners in the same field than with compatriots in the other
field.
While one suspects that Socrates' purpose in warning that the wise
know what they do not know was to inspire learning, its more common
effect is to induce prudent silence. "Fields" appear to develop in
isolation from each other. In law, this can produce an interesting
dynamic when events force an intersection of fields dominated by
separate guilds responsive to different needs, traditions, and policies.
The typical response is to view this as a challenge requiring more
precise jurisdictional or hierarchical lines between the fields, rather than
as an opportunity for learning, adaptation and synthesis.
This essay, then, is an attempt by an aficionado of the law of the
sea to swim against the tide, but only a modest distance. Its object is to
assemble for his colleagues expert in human rights some detailed
information regarding the law of the sea, recognizing that they are in a
better position to discern and evaluate the significance of that informa-
tion for the development of the law of human rights.
1. "International law is not a 'course'; it is a curriculum. Whether studied under one
embracing rubric or spread over many, international law is a comprehensive, many-sided legal
system." Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS xxx (2d ed.
1987).
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The approachto selectingthe potential objects of human rights law
is therefore very broad, probably broader than many experts believe
reflects the actual, or even appropriate, state of human rights law.
Readers may select from the menu as they wish, and will find the more
traditional fare as well as information of what Louis Henkin has aptly
termed the "commonage."
II. THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea2 is not
ordinarily considered a human rights instrument. With few exceptions,
its role in advancing human rights is not obvious or direct. But neither
is it negligible. That role merits consideration because of three
characteristics of the Convention:
It is a global conventionthat applies to all activities regarding
a vast area of the planet. Its scope ratione loci and ratione
materiae rivals that of all but the most comprehensive of
global human rights conventions.
A large and increasing majority of states is party to the
Convention. From the perspective of ratification, it rivals the
most successful global human rights conventions.
Its parties accept binding arbitration or adjudication of most
disputes arising under the Convention. In this respect, it
represents a potential advance on many existing human rights
instruments, both global and regional.'
From the perspective of those interested in human rights, the law
of the sea may seem to be primarily about natural resources and the
environment.4 Although there is much in the law of the sea that merits
analysis from that perspective, the Convention also addresses traditional
2. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, done at Montego Bay, Dec. 10,
1982, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/ 1-22 (1982), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) and UNITED
NATIONS, THE LAW OF THE SEA, U.N. Sales No. E.83v. 5 (1983) [hereinafter L.O.S. Convention
or Convention].
3. Except in specific instances, the Convention does not however confer mandatory
jurisdiction over actions brought by private persons.
4. Thus, for example, while non-governmental organizations interested in economic
development and environmental protection were active during the negotiation of the
Convention at the Third United Nations Conference on Law of the Sea, human rights
organizations concerned with traditional individual liberties and procedural due process
generally were not.
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human rights preoccupations with the rule of law, individual liberties
and procedural due process.
III. THE RULE OF LAW
It is generally, although perhaps not universally, recognized that
the existence of the rule of law is an indispensable condition for the
protection of human rights. This is no less true of economic and social
rights than it is of civil and political rights. Although international law
ordinarily plays only a background role in the establishment of the rule
of law for most individuals, that role is of particular importance at sea.
This is because of the transitory nature and geographic reach of many
activities at sea, and the complex jurisdictional structure this entails.
Much like conflict on land, disputes between states regarding their
respective rights to use and to control the sea can affect individuals
caught in the dispute, and too often have affected individual rights
adversely.
In its most general sense, the Convention promotes the rule of law
at sea by allocating authority to govern and by imposing qualifications
on that authority in different situations. It articulates the relevant rights
and duties of states in precise written form, converts those written
articulations into binding treaty obligations expressly accepted by
governments pursuant to their constitutional procedures, and subjects
most of those articulations to binding arbitration or adjudication. It thus
provides an international legal order whose existence is itself necessary
for the maintenance of order under municipal law.
Effective governance is an essential precondition for, although not
by itself a guarantee of, the rule of law. The Convention is less sanguine
than some other treaties about the assumption that the right to govern
ensures the fulfillment of the duty to govern and to do so effectively.
In additionto its basic preoccupationwith the duties of states to ensure
that their nationals and vessels respect the interests of others, the
Convention also seeks to provide for effective governance at sea.
Extensive duties of governance are elaborated with respect to the flag
states of ships, particularly with regard to labor conditions, safety and
pollution.' Similarly, international elaboration of the duty of the
5. See Convention, supra note 2, arts. 58(2), 94, 211(2), 217. While the pollution
enforcement obligations apply "irrespective of where a violation occurs," the obligations under
article 94 do not apply as such in waters landward of the exclusive economic zone. This is
unlikely to pose significant legal problems. Many of the obligations under article 94 are
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sponsoring state to govern effectively is envisaged with respect to
mining in the international seabed area, including installations used for
that purpose.6 Except perhaps with respect to prevention of pollution,7
the Convention is less explicitly demanding of coastal states with
respect to offshore installations and structures subject to their jurisdic-
tion, although some safety requirements are imposed.'
The law of piracy is perhaps the best known example of the
attempt to extend the rule of law to the sea. What is too rarely under-
stood about the law of piracy is that most of its rules are designed to
refine and circumscribe the universal enforcement and adjudicative
jurisdiction it confers.9 The objective is to create just enough universal
jurisdiction to respond to the practical problem posed by murder and
mayhem on the high seas, but not so much as to threaten random
violence"0 or unwarranted interference with freedom of navigation and
the liberty interests associated with that freedom. Thus, for example,
there is liability for seizure without adequate grounds."
It may be, therefore, that the piracy "precedent" is at times invoked
for the wrong reasons by those who would internationalize the criminal
law, with possibly adverse effects for liberty interests. There is no
express duty to prosecute pirates; the duty is "to co-operate to the fullest
possible extent in the repression of piracy."' 2 There is no express
provision to the effect that murder and mayhem on the high seas
constitute an "international crime"; there is an allocation of extraordi-
nary universal enforcement and adjudication because of the objective
difficulty of dealing with "pirate" vessels on the high seas under
ordinary rules of flag state jurisdiction. The embrace of "universal"
jurisdiction is far from unqualified; it is cautious, precisely circum-
continuous in nature. Moreover, the substance of article 94 may inform the meaning of other
rules applicable in waters landward of the exclusive economic zone. See id. arts. 2(3), 19(1),
21(4), 23, 39, 54.
6. See id. arts. 139, 145-47, 153; ann. III arts. 4(4), 17.
7. See id. arts. 208, 214.
8. See id. arts. 60, 80. Articles 60 and 80 do not apply as such to installations and
structures in waters landward of the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf,
although they may inform the meaning of other rules applicable in those areas. See id. arts.
2(3), 24, 44, 45(2), 54.
9. See id. arts. 100-06.
10. "A seizure on account of piracy may be carried out only by warships or military
aircraft, or other ships or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being on government
service and authorized to that effect." Id. art. 107.
11. See id. art. 106.
12. Id. art. 100.
1997]
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 39
scribed, and if anything discouraged by potential liability. Part of the
reason for this caution is that piracy presents an unusual case of
universal jurisdiction; it gives rise not only to a universal right to
adjudicate, but to a universal right to seize and arrest on the high seas.
There can be no doubt that the extension of the rule of law to the
sea requires the suppression ofpiracy. What is interesting about the law
of piracy is that, notwithstanding that basic imperative, great care was
taken to protect liberty interests by defining and deterring excessive
zeal. The result is that one almost never hears complaints about abuse
of universal piracy jurisdiction by any state.
IV. COMMUNITY RIGHTS
On the broadest level, the Convention as a whole seeks to advance
the interests of humanity by establishing "a legal order for the seas and
oceans which will facilitate international communication, and will
promote the peaceful uses of the seas and oceans, the equitable and
efficient utilization of their resources, the conservation of their living
resources, and the study, protection and preservation of the marine
environment,"'13 and by contributing "to the realization of a just and
equitable international economic order which takes into account the
interests and needs of mankind as a whole." 14 But in addition, the
Convention recognizes and seeks to advance certain specific community
interests of the kind that at least some commentators have associated
with "affirmative" human rights. While these "rights" are generally not
enforceable by or against individuals under the Convention, in many
circumstances they are articulated as duties owed by a state to many if
not all other states party and may be enforced by those states pursuant
to the compulsory dispute settlement provisions of the Convention.
Whatever the doubts about the relationship to human rights of the
underlying concepts of community rights in general, or of common,
cultural, or environmentalrights in particular, the purposes of this essay
are best served by erring (if error there be) on the side of inclusion. The
point at which the duty of a state under international law gives rise to
what may properly be called the right of an individual is not always easy
to discern. One procedural clue is its articulation as an obligation erga
omnes according standing to complain, and to sue, to any other State
13. Convention, supra note 2, pmbl. para. 4.
14. Id. para. 5.
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Party. This may not be the same as a private right to sue but, given the
existing public order it unquestionably represents some progress.
A. The International Seabed Area
Perhaps the best known of the Convention's prescriptions with
respect to community rights is the declaration that the international
seabed area and its resources are the "common heritage of mankind."'"
The Convention goes on to provide that all "rights in the resources of
the Area are vested in mankind as a whole, on whose behalf the
[International Sea-Bed] Authority shall act."16 The development of the
Area's resources must "be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a
whole."' 7 Elaborate procedural and substantive provisions are included
for realizing these goals, most notably the creation of a global regula-
tory system subject to judicial review by an independent international
tribunal.
Now that the 1994 ImplementingAgreementregarding Part XI has
made clear that these goals are compatible with and will be realized
through a market approach to deep seabed mining," it is perhaps easier
to reflect upon the fiduciary obligations implied by these provisions.
Although the organs of the Sea-Bed Authority are either comprised of
or elected by states, their duty is to mankind as a whole. While the idea
of a duty to all humanity is no stranger to the work of many interna-
tional organizations, articulation of the duty, beyond the limited context
of the international civil service, is largely a new development when
viewed from the perspective of positive law set forth in the operative
provisions of a treaty. Its implications undoubtedly will unfold slowly
over many years.' 9
No particular vision of the public interest is enshrined by this idea.
Lawyers are adept at demonstrating how their positions serve the public
15. Convention, supra note 2, art. 136.
16. Id. art. 137(2). This idea that the Authority acts on behalf of mankind as a whole is
repeated in article 153(1).
17. Id. art. 140(1).
18. Argument Relating to the Implementation of Part IX of the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, Oct 7, 1994, U.N.GAOR, 48th Sess, 101st. Plen
mtg., Annex, U.N. Doc. A/Res/48/263/Annex (1994), S.Treaty Doc. No. 103-39, at 263,
reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1309 (1996).
19. The underlying idea is perhaps adumbrated by the reference to "We the Peoples" that
opens the preamble to the Charter of the United Nations, although even in that respect there
may be a difference between the reference to "peoples" in the plural and the reference to
"mankind as a whole" in the singular.
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interest. The Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber is likely to be careful to avoid
even the appearance that it is improperly substituting its discretion for
that of the Authority. °
In some cases, the fiduciary idea may serve to reinforce certain
concepts already reflected in the Convention. For example, the
reference in the singular to "mankind as a whole" may serve to reinforce
the principle of nondiscrimination. 1 In other cases-for example a
demand by a broadly based non-governmental organization for
appropriate access-the idea could have procedural implications linked
to the concept of "transparency" and public access.
There is at least one area in which the textual idea of a fiduciary
duty to mankind as a whole is likely to support a result of direct
relevance to traditional human rights, namely the treatment of employ-
ees of the Authority. Thus, for example, the Convention provides for
proceedings against employees accused of violating their responsibili-
ties, including their duty not to disclose proprietary data or other
confidential information.' While there is ample precedent in the United
Nations and elsewhere for concluding that the Authority must respect
the human rights of its employees in proceedings against them,23 the
idea that the Authority acts on behalf of mankind reinforces that
conclusion and may extend its reach.
The same idea is likely to strengthen and supplement the provi-
sions in the Convention designed to protect intellectual property rights
and contract rights of miners. The conceptual link between respect for
the rights of employees and respect for the rights of contractors and
other persons is itself supported by the text of the Convention. Thus,
for example, personnel records as well as proprietary data are protected
from public inspection by the same provision of the Convention.24
Of particular interest is the fact that the provisions regarding the
benefit of mankind include the sharing of financial and other economic
benefits (e.g., royalties) from mining of the international seabed area on
a non-discriminatory basis.25 Here the idea of benefit for all mankind
20. See Convention, supra note 2, art. 189.
21. See id. art. 152.
22. See id. art. 168.
23. The preamble of the Convention affirms "that matters not regulated by this
Convention continue to be governed by the rules and principles of general international law."
24. See id. art. 181(2).
25. This is to be done "taking into particular consideration the interests and needs of
developing States." See id. arts. 140(2), 160(2)(f)(i).
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is expressly stated to include "peoples who have not attained full
independence or other self-governing status. 26
B. Cultural Heritage
Article 303 of the L.O.S. Convention articulates a universal duty
to protect objects of an archaeological and historical nature. Because it
applies throughoutthe sea, and therefore to the coastal areas where most
objects are likely to be found, this duty is of far more practical signifi-
cance that the complementary duty set forth in article 149, applicable
only to the international seabed area, to preserve or dispose of such
objects for the benefit of mankind as a whole. 27 While terms such as
"common heritage" are not used, the underlying idea that mankind has
an undivided interest in protection of its cultural heritage would appear
to be implicit in these provisions.
At the same time, both provisions of the Convention dealing with
cultural heritage reflect arri~respensies that are not entirely at one with
the idea of a common cultural heritage. Article 303 goes on to provide
for coastal state jurisdiction in the 24-mile contiguous zone. Article
149 follows its statement of the duty with the clause, "particular regard
being paid to the preferential rights of the State or country of origin, or
the State of cultural origin, or the State of historical and archaeological
origin." A possible implication is that the right in cultural heritage at
least in some respects may be a particular one enjoyed by a certain state
rather than a common one enjoyed by mankind as a whole.
26. Id. arts. 140(2), 160(2)(f)(i).
27. It would appear that the duty to protect cultural heritage in areas beyond coastal state
jurisdiction is subject to compulsory arbitration or adjudication. However, apart from possible
problems concerning navigation rights or environmental duties, it is unclear to what extent the
duty is not subject to compulsory arbitration or adjudication in areas subject to coastal state
jurisdiction. Id. arts. 286, 297. The regulatory powers of the Sea-Bed Authority are limited to
"activities in the Area," defined as "all activities of exploration for, and exploitation of, the
resources of the Area." Id. art. 1(3). For purposes of Part XI, "resources" are defined as "all
solid, liquid or gaseous mineral resources in situ in the Area at or beneath the sea-bed, including
polymetallic nodules," and are referred to as "minerals" when recovered from the Area. Id. art.
133. Pursuant to these provisions, the regulatory competence of the Authority presumably
would not embrace the duty to protect cultural property unless perhaps an issue arises in the
context of mining activities. Id. art. 147(1).
28. This in turn was evidently regarded as too modest by some coastal states. What
followed was a burst of nationalism in the unfortunate draft convention considered by the
International Law Association, which was excessive in its depiction of coastal state rights
influenced by the extreme nationalist claims of Ecuador rejected at the Law of the Sea
Conference, and anemic in its elaboration of coastal state duties.
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Quite apart from its other defects, an unduly nationalist approach
ignores the fact that, for coastal communities in particular, the sea may
have been a culturally unifying force. Was it not both gracious and
appropriate for Tunisia to present an artifact representing the Roman
period of its history as a gift to the new International Tribunal on the
Law of the Sea?
C. The Environment
Article 192 declares, "States have the obligation to protect and
preserve the marine environment." It is implemented by very elaborate
provisions in Part XII of the L.O.S. Conventionand elsewhere regarding
pollution control and general environmental protection, and is comple-
mented by a duty to conserve living resources. 29  While a general
community legal interest in a protected environment is not articulated
as such, it is unquestionably implicit in these provisions.
This is particularly evident in the article regarding provisional
measures that may be prescribed by a tribunal. In addition to the
traditional competence to prescribe provisional measures "to preserve
the respective rights of the parties to the dispute" pendente lite, the
Convention adds that such measures also may be prescribed "to prevent
serious harm to the marine environment."3 While, as a procedural
matter, the tribunal may prescribe provisional measures only at the
request of a party to the dispute,31 the environmental interest justifying
provisional measures in such a case may be independent of the rights of
29. See Convention, supra note 2, arts. 61, 63-67, 117-20. Not all of these articles on
conservation of living resources apply as such to waters landward of the exclusive economic
zone or, pursuant to article 68, to sedentary species of the continental shelf. It is however
reasonable to assume that, where there is a gap, the general duty to protect and preserve the
marine environment under article 192, which applies to all of the marine environment, includes
a duty to conserve living resources.
30. See id. art. 290(1). In a similarly expansive provision, article 30(5) of the 1995
Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory
Fish Stocks, opened for signature, Dec. 4, 1995, U.N. Doe. A/Conf.164/3 (1995), reprinted in
34 I.L.M. 1542 (1995), incorporates by reference the dispute settlement provisions of the
Convention but adds, as applicable law, that the tribunal should apply, in addition to the
Convention, the Agreement and other relevant agreements, "generally accepted standards for
the conservation and management of living marine resources and other rules of international
law not incompatible with the Convention," and that this should be done "with a view to
ensuring the conservation of the straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks
concerned."
31. See Convention, supra note 2, art. 290(3).
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the parties as such and the tribunal "may prescribe any provisional
measures which it considers appropriate under the circumstances."32
A long-term decisionto prohibit any exploitationof a creature may
reflect more than conservation concerns. While the rhetoric of
conservation, prudence and administrative efficiency may persist, it may
mask deeper concerns about our relationship with that creature. These
concerns may transcend the issue of conservation of the species and
suggest an ethical duty not to kill any individual of that species.
Because the relationship between treaties and ethics, even environ-
mental ethics, is rarely obvious or direct, it may be of some interest that
the Convention expressly permits a coastal state or international
organization "to prohibit, limit or regulate the exploitation of marine
mammals more strictly" than required for conservation alone.33
The provisions of the Convention regarding protection and
preservation of the environment are subject to compulsory arbitration
or adjudication between states.34 Insofar as fisheries conservation is
concerned, however, the obligation to arbitrate or adjudicate is
essentially limited to fisheries beyond the exclusive economic zone.35
Standing to sue may well be one of the more important motives for
asserting the existence of a human right to a decent environment. While
private parties do not enjoy access to international tribunals under the
Convention to redress environmental injuries, there is a provision
requiring states to "ensure that recourse is available in accordance with
their legal systems for prompt and adequate compensation or other relief
in respect of damage caused by pollution of the marine environment by
natural or juridical persons under [the] jurisdiction [of the forum
state]." '36 Because this provision seeks to build on a base of municipal
32. See id. art. 290(1).
33. Id. arts. 65, 120. The effect is to exempt marine mammals from the Convention's
policy of optimum utilization within the limits of optimum sustainable yield. See id arts. 61(3),
62(1) & (2), 64(1), 119(1)(a).
34. See id. art. 286. With respect to the obligations of coastal states to control pollution
in the exercise of their sovereign rights or jurisdiction (principally with respect to development
of the seabed within their jurisdiction), jurisdiction extends only to violations of specified
international rules and standards. See id. art. 297(1)(c). The International Sea-Bed Authority
has regulatory powers with respect to pollution from mining activities in the international
seabed area. See id. arts. 145, 162(2)(w)&(x); ann. III art. 17(1)(b)(xii) & (2)(f).
35. See id art. 297(3). There is a requirement of conciliation with respect to conservation
in the exclusive economic zone. While disputes regarding conservation of sedentary species
of the continental shelf are not expressly excluded from compulsory arbitration or adjudication,
the absence of an express conservation obligation with respect to such species could render the
question moot.
36. Id. art. 235(2).
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law and municipal courts, its precise legal implications are likely to vary
from one municipal legal system to another. For those who believe that
the vindication of individual fights for the foreseeable future is likely to
depend on the action of municipal courts in most cases, there may be
good reason to follow the implementationofthis provision with interest.
D. Transparency
The effective exercise of political and other fights requires, among
other things, information regarding activities of governments and
intergovemmentalorganizations and facts about the world in which we
live. One way to achieve this is by public notice. While the Convention
itself contains no broad obligations of transparency, and the purpose of
its requirements for notice may not be accountability to the public at
large, that can be the effect. There are a significant number of provisions
of the Convention, many of them new to the law of the sea, that require
public notice of events and governmental actions.37
A requirement for official inquiry,38 publication of reports,3 9 data
exchange,4° or independent financial audit41 can take the notice
requirement an important step further. In the case of marine scientific
research, open dissemination of results is generally mandated.42 In the
context of marine scientific research, a state also has a duty to provide
other states "with a reasonable opportunity to obtain from it, or with its
co-operation, information necessary to prevent and control damage to
the health and safety of persons and to the marine environment."43
Requirements of cooperation among states through intergovern-
mental organizations can be an important source of public information,
particularly in light of the increasingly liberal atmosphere regarding
access of non-governmental organizations to the work of intergovern-
37. See, e.g., id. arts. 16, 21(3), 22(4), 24(2), 25(3), 41(6), 42(3), 44, 47(9), 52(2), 53(5),
60(3), 62(5). 75, 76(8), 84, 198, 211(3), 231.
38. See id. art. 94(7).
39. See id. arts. 205-06, regarding publication of environmental studies.
40. See id. arts. 61(5), 119(2).
41. See id. art. 175.
42. See id. arts. 143(3)(c), 244, 249(1)(e).
43. Id. art. 242(2). It is unclear what specter of deceit was conjured by Peru to convince
coastal states of the need to qualify such an obviously humanitarian and flexible provision with
the words "as appropriate." It is to be hoped that in practice states will understand that a request
for a "reasonable" opportunity to obtain information "necessary" to prevent and control damage
to the health and safety of persons and to the marine environment would only rarely, if ever,
be inappropriate.
36:399
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA
mental organizations. Quite apart from the work of the International
Sea-Bed Authority, the Convention contains many provisions dealing
with cooperation through international organizations.' Dispute
settlement proceedings also can be a rich source of public information.
V. DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
It is not clear that distributive justice is an appropriate point of
reference for analyzing the Convention and the law of the sea. There is
a risk of confusing the allocation to states of governmental powers over
resources with the wise utilization of those powers by governments for
economic or other ends, including maximization and distribution of
wealth. Apart from environmental and conservation matters, the latter
question is largely beyond the scope of the Convention's provisions
regarding the exercise of the powers it confers on individual states,
whatever their relative wealth.45 Some readers nevertheless may wish
to reflect upon the provisions of the Convention dealing with the
allocation of governmental powers over natural resources.
It may be argued that the establishment of extended coastal state
jurisdiction over the natural resources of the 200-mile46 exclusive
economic zone and the continental shelf where it extends beyond 200
miles is responsive to distributive values because the coastal states that
thereby acquire jurisdiction include developing coastal states. The
contention requires careful evaluation. Coastal geography and
economic demography are not the same thing. In terms of both the size
and the resource potential of the zones they acquire, some of the richest
industrial states and the most industrialized of the developing countries
are among the biggest "winners" of this allocation to coastal states of
control over natural resources.47 The "losers" include some of the
poorest landlocked and "geographically disadvantaged" countries in the
world.
44. See, e.g., Convention, supra note 2, arts. 41, 53, 61(2), 64(1), 66(5), 143(3)(a), 200-
02, 204-12.
45. Resolution III adopted by the Third U.N. Conference on Law of the Sea declares, inter
alia: "In the case of a territory whose people have not attained full independence or other self-
governing status recognized by the United Nations, or a territory under colonial domination,
provisions concerning rights and interests under the Convention shall be implemented for the
benefit of the people of the territory with a view to promoting their well-being and
development."
46. The references to miles in this article refer to nautical miles.
47. The United States, for example, acquires the largest and perhaps richest exclusive
economic zone of all.
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With respect to seabed areas, the choice was between a broadly
defined continental shelf subject to coastal statejurisdictionand a larger
international seabed area under international administration as "the
common heritage of mankind." The latter presumably would have been
more responsive to distributive values than the former.
There is provision for some sharing of coastal state revenues from
hydrocarbons and other non-living resources of the continental shelf
seaward of 200 miles from the coastal baselines.48 The shared funds are
to be distributed to States Parties "on the basis of equitable sharing
criteria, taking into account the interests and needs of developing States,
particularlythe least developed and the land-locked among them."49 It
should be borne in mind, however, that this provision excludes vast
areas landward of 200 miles, and in historical context represents a
rejection of a proposal by President Nixon for revenue sharing to apply
to a much larger area beginning much closer to the coast, namely all of
the continental margin outside the territorial sea beyond the point where
waters reach a depth of 200 meters.5" One of the reasons for the U.S.
proposal was the belief that consensus would not be possible without
coastal state control over the hydrocarbon potential of the continental
margin, but that because of the distributive effects of such a result, to
achieve consensus it would also be necessary to offer some global
participation in economic rent if the exclusive right to collect such rent
from offshore hydrocarbons were to be allocated solely on the basis of
coastal geography.
With respect to fisheries, the choice was between coastal state
jurisdiction and freedom of fishing subject to management by regional
organizations comprised of the coastal states and fishing states
concerned. To the extent that the regional organizations were not doing
a good job of conservation, were not generating economic rent for the
coastal states, and were not especially responsive to coastal state fishing
interests, it can be argued that the establishment of broad coastal state
jurisdiction, whatever its own inequities, is likely to be more responsive
to distributive values than an open fishing regime. This may be
particularly true from the perspective of local fishermen with small
boats of limited range. A primary purpose ofestablishingthe exclusive
economic zone was to provide local fishermen, to the extent of their
48. See Convention, supra note 2, art. 82.
49. Id. para. 4.
50. The Convention also adds an exclusion from making payments for a developing
coastal state in respect of a mineral resource of which it is a net importer.
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harvesting capacity, with a monopoly on access to fisheries off their
own coast. Not only economics, but social factors also influenced the
desire to protect the traditional way of life of coastal fishing communi-
ties beset by competition from abroad.
In the event, many of the hoped-for benefits have yet to material-
ize. Fishery stocks deteriorate while fishing effort expands. Despitethe
contributions of F.A.O. and other organizations, it has proved more
difficult than expected to create or expand local fishing industries in
many developing countries, and to adopt and enforce effective conserva-
tion measures (including capacity controls and effort restrictions).
Even in developed countries, where foreign fishing has been eliminated
or brought under control, enforcing effective conservation measures has
proved difficult. License fees and other economic rent collected by
coastal states from foreign fishermen do not constitute a bonanza,
although for a few governments of some small islands, for example,
they may be an important income supplement. There is reason to
wonder whether in some casesjoint ventures between foreign fishermen
and local companies have yielded much more than participation in
profits for essentially passive local partners.
It is perhaps less understandable that the extensive provisions on
fisheries have little to say about nutritional needs. Those needs are
expressly mentioned only as factors to be taken into account in
determining the modalities for participation by land-locked and
"geographically disadvantaged" states "in the exploitation of an
appropriate part of the surplus of the living resources of the exclusive
economic zones of coastal States of the same subregion or region."51
However, although not mentioned as such, nutrition was one of the
reasons for imposing a general obligation on the coastal state to allocate
to fishermen of foreign states the right to capture fisheries in the
exclusive economic zone surplus to its own harvesting capacity.
5 2
The provisions of the Convention on the access of landlocked and
"geographically disadvantaged"states to fisheries in the economic zones
of their coastal neighbors are an obvious concession in principle to
distributive values. But what is granted amounts to little more than an
apparent priority over third states with regard to agreed access to an
undetermined part of a surplus of changing size calculated by the coastal
state.53 In theory, this may in some measure qualify the right of the
51. Convention, supra note 2, arts. 69(1)&(2), 70(1)&(3).
52. See id. art. 62(1)&(2)
53. See id. arts. 69-72.
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coastal state to maximize economic rent from surplus fisheries in its
exclusive economic zone, that is, in the vivid metaphor of former
Foreign Minister Jorge Castafieda of Mexico, "to marry the bride with
the largest dowry." However, the text places no significantrestraints on
the capacity of the coastal state to distribute first to its own fishermen,
to expand such distributions as their fishing capacity increase, and to
permit foreign capital or labor to participate in what is regarded as the
coastal state's own fishery.
Meanwhile, China, South Korea, and others are adding their own
wide-ranging fishing fleets to those of Europe, Russia, and Japan that
were the ostensible "evil to be remedied" by exclusive economic zones
in the first place.
VI. THE DUTY TO RESCUE
The duty of states to require ships of their nationality to rescue
persons in danger or distress is one of the traditional hallmarks of the
law of the sea. Like universal jurisdiction to suppress piracy, a
universal duty to rescue is a practical response to the problem of danger
at sea. The duty is expressly confirmed by the Convention, which
makes clear that it applies to "any person" found at sea in danger of
being lost.54
As a technical drafting matter, this duty applies to the exclusive
economic zone and the classic high seas beyond but does not apply
expressly in the territorial sea. 5 The geographic expansion of the
territorial sea from a traditional three-mile limit to a maximum twelve-
mile limit56 accentuated the importance of this potential lacuna. Of
course, the possible implicationthat the abstract sovereignty of a coastal
state precludes emergency rescue from drowning is a perverse insult to
any rational concept of territorial sovereignty at sea.
The L.O.S. Convention corrects this drafting problem by recogniz-
ing the priority traditionally accorded rescue in the laws and customs of
the sea. It makes clear that ships in innocent passage through the
territorial sea and other waters57 may stop not only to save themselves
54. See id. art. 98. An Hohfoldian might conclude that international law establishes a
right to be rescued at sea.
55. See id. arts. 58(2), 86.
- 56. See id. art. 3.
57. In addition to the territorial sea, there is a right of innocent passage through
archipelagic waters and certain internal waters. See id. arts. 8(2), 52.
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but "for the purpose of rendering assistance to persons, ships or aircraft
in danger or distress.""8 This provision is not properly regarded as
articulating a new right or the expansion of an existing right. It
constitutes a recognition that a universal duty to rescue at sea has
existed since time immemorial, that this duty has been respected
without regard to changing views regarding the juridical status of the
sea, and that this duty finds new support in modem international law in




The fact that the international law of the sea traditionally does not
deal with private property rights renders all the more impressive its
unequivocal negation of property rights over human beings. Repeating
the established rule, the Convention not only requires States to prevent
and punish the transport of slaves in ships flying their flag, but declares
with respect to the high seas and the exclusive economic zone, "[a]ny
slave taking refuge on board any ship, whatever its flag, shall ipso facto
be free." 9 The duties of the flag state under this provision are subject
to compulsory arbitration or adjudication.
B. Fisheries
Like most provisions of international treaties, the fisheries
provisions of the Convention deal with the rights and duties of states,
not individuals. The dominantmotive of coastal states in negotiatingthe
fisheries provisions of the Convention was to change the status quo.
58. Id art. 18(2). The provisions regarding transit passage through straits make no explicit
mention either of the general prohibition on stopping or of the exceptions set forth in article
18(2). Since transit passage is intended to accord greater, not more restrictive, rights of passage
than does innocent passage, the rational conclusion is that a rescue regime no more restrictive
than that set forth in article 18(2) applies. As a textual matter this conclusion could be rooted
in a variety of provisions, including the duty of ships in transit passage to comply with
generally accepted international regulations, procedures and practices for safety at sea. See id.
art. 39(2). The same analysis would apply with respect to the comparable regime of
archipelagic sea lanes passage. Indeed, the situation in archipelagos clearly indicates the
rationality of this conclusion; it would be absurd to maintain that the rescue regime applies in
all archipelagic waters except those falling within sea lanes designated by the archipelagic state
with the approval of the competent international organization. See id. arts. 52-54.
59. Id. art. 99.
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Moreover, international law and municipal law are regarded as loath to
recognize private property rights to wild animals before capture.
Accordingly, it was to be expected that the Convention would have little
to say about "vested" access rights of fishermen to traditional fishing
grounds, notwithstandingthe effect on their means of livelihood of the
vast extensions of fisheries jurisdiction permitted by the Convention.
Nevertheless, there is a general reference to traditional rights and
express protection for traditional fishing rights in parts of archipelagic
waters.6" In addition, in allocating fisheries in its exclusive economic
zone that exceed its own harvesting capacity, among the factors the
coastal state must take into account is "the need to minimize economic
dislocation in States whose nationals have habitually fished in the
zone.'
C. Seabed Mining
Unlike most of the Convention, Part XI addresses itself directly to
the real parties in interest: seabed mining companies. If they are
sponsored by a state party that assumes general supervisory duties,
private companies may apply to the Sea-Bed Authority for exclusive
exploration or exploitation rights to a mine site in the international
seabed area beyond the continental shelf.62 As the 1994 Implementing
Agreement makes clear, the grounds on which an application may be
denied are extremely limited. Those interested in the theoretical
foundations for property rights might discern something of the influence
of John Locke's thinking in the criteria set forth in the Convention for
nondiscriminatoryrules and regulations dealing with the size, duration,
and performance requirements for mine sites.63
Private property rights are rights enjoyed erga omnes. They ul-
timately depend on the authority under international law to confer such
rights. The establishment of a basis in international law for conferring
such rights in areas beyond the territorial sea was in large part a
response to the position that exclusive mining rights of sufficient
duration in a site of sufficient size are a necessary precondition to
60. See id. arts. 47(6), 51(1).
61. Id. art. 62(3). The prohibition on high seas fishing for anadromous stocks (salmon)
contains a very limited exception "in cases where this provision would result in economic
dislocation for a State other than the State of origin." Id. art. 66(3)(a).
62. See id. art. 153(2)(b).
63. See id. ann. III, art. 17(2)(a)&(b),(3). The 1994 Implementing Agreement clarifies
these requirements.
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private investment in the development of nonliving resources of the
seabed and subsoil. In 1945, President Truman's response to this
problem was the extension of coastal state jurisdiction over the
continental shelf, thereby enabling each coastal state in its discretion to
grant (or, it is sometimes forgotten, to refuse to grant) development
rights on its continental shelf. Once one imagined a maximum seaward
limit to coastal state jurisdiction, the response to this problem in the
remaining "international" seabed area would necessarily entail an
international system for conferring exclusive mining rights. Behind the
rhetoric with which enthusiasts and skeptics adorn the International Sea-
Bed Authority is the inescapable fact that it owes its existence in large
measure to the demand for a system for acquiring property rights valid
erga omnes in the international seabed area.
1. Boundaries
The appearance of private rights to develop fixed seabed resources
stimulated a demand for greater precision and stability in maritime
boundaries than had previously been thought necessary. In effect, the
law of the sea was being asked to supply, in boundary regions, the
certainty and stability that commonly characterize property rights.
Investors need to know who has the authority under international law to
confer property rights in which area, and need to know whether this
allocation of authority under international law is likely to change in a
way that undermines the property rights on which they base their
investments. For example, they need to know where the boundary is
between the continental shelf of a coastal state and the international
seabed area, and they need to know how stable that boundary is likely
to be.64 To minimize risk, investors in boundary regions generally
prefer a stable boundary that can be located with precision.
A definition of the legal "continental shelf' as extending to the
outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 miles from
coastal baselines, accommodates these concerns in principle.6"
However, significant risks remain for investments in fixed sites:
baselines may change in response to changes in nature or policy, and the
location of the outer edge of the continental margin is far from obvious.
The Convention seeks to minimize these risks by requiring the coastal
64. The seaward boundary of the continental shelf is the landward boundary of the
international seabed area. See Convention, supra note 2, art. 134(3).
65. See id. art. 76(1).
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state to deposit charts and data with the United Nations "permanently"
describing the outer limits of its continental shelf.6
This may require a coastal state to identify the outer limit of the
continental shelf in an area where the continental margin extends
beyond 200 miles. The Convention establishes detailed criteria for
doing so, and requires the coastal state to submit its proposals and
supporting geological data to an international commission of experts. 7
Precision, legitimacy and stability with respect to the outer edge of the
continental margin are the goals of the rule that the limits of the
continental shelf established by a coastal state on the basis of the
recommendations of the international commission "shall be final and
binding."
2. Mine Sites and Intellectual Property
A system of private access to an international organization for the
acquisition of mining rights invites the elaboration of provisions dealing
directly with the property and other economic rights of the private party,
the legality of actions by the organization, and judicial review.
Mining companies acquire exclusive mining rights to a specific
site in the form of a contract.68 It may be revised only with the consent
of the parties.69 It must provide for security of tenure.7 ° The Conven-
tion spells out both the substantive criteria and procedural requirements
for imposing penalties on a contractor for "serious, persistent and wilful
violations of the fundamental terms of the contract" or the Convention,
or for failure to comply with a final binding decision of a dispute
settlement body.71 Those penalties may be monetary or may entail
suspension or termination of the contractor's rights. However, "the
Authority may not execute a decision involving monetary penalties,
suspension or termination until the contractor has been accorded a
66. See id. art. 76(9).
67. See id. art. 76(2)-(8); ann. II.
68. See id. art. 153(3); ann. III art. 16.
69. See id. ann. III art. 19(2).
70. See id. art. 153(6); ann. III art. 16. It might be noted that efforts were made to address
the question of investment security and protections against expropriation in the provisions
dealing with seabed areas subject to coastal state jurisdiction. They did not succeed.
71. Seeid. ann. IIIart. 18.
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reasonable opportunity to exhaust the judicial remedies available to
him. 72
In addition, in connectionwith requirementsfor submission of data
and information, there is elaborate protection of intellectual property,
including industrial secrets and proprietary data.7'
3. Judicial Review
The actions of the Sea-Bed Authority are subject to judicial or
arbitral review initiated either by a state party or by a private contractor
or prospective contractor.74 A private company may sue the Authority
to protect its mining rights under the mining contract or to challenge a
denial of a contract; in that case either party may elect arbitration in lieu
of the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea. In that Chamber, a State Party also enjoys not only the
right to adjudicate the legality of the Authority's administrative
decisions but the unusual right to adjudicate the legality of general rules
and regulations (whose adoption requires, inter alia, a consensus in the
Council of the Authority). Negotiationof the latter right posed difficult
questions of judicial review in principle and in practice, and gave rise
to a complex provision regarding the scope of review that draws on
public law doctrine in a number of different systems.75 Needless to say,
limitations on powers of governance that are subject to judicial review
are widely regarded as essential to the protection of liberty and property.
VIII. COMMUNICATIONS
The Convention does not address the individual right to travel or
communicate as such. But it addresses in great detail the essential
predicate for the exercise of such individual rights, namely the right of
each state, by conferring its nationality on ships and aircraft, to secure
for them global rights of navigation.76 It also addresses the right of each
72. See id. ann. III art. 18(3). This requirement does not apply to emergency orders of the
Council to prevent serious harm to the marine environment.
73. See id. arts. 168(2), 181; ann. III art. 14(3).
74. See id. art. 187.
75. See id. art. 189.
76. See id. arts. 8(2), 17, 38, 45, 52, 53(2) & (12), 58(1), 87, 91.
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state to authorize its nationals to lay and maintain submarine cables and
pipelines throughout most of the sea."
The implications of this system for the underlying right of
individuals to travel and communicate are profound. The extent to
which this is taken for granted is nicely revealed by the editorial
comment made by one of the organizers of this symposium: "Is this not
too tangential?"
In large measure, a ship navigating at sea is beyond the jurisdic-
tional reach of any state but the flag state, at least for purposes of
boarding, search, and seizure.78 In several contexts, the Convention
expressly imposes liability on a state for unjustified boarding, search or
seizure of a foreign ship.79 This has clear, albeit indirect, implications
for both property rights and liberty interests. Interestingly,two of these
provisions mention the ship rather than the flag state as the recipient of
the compensation." Another provision not only implicitly establishes
liability directly to the ship or its owner but requires states to provide
for recourse "in their courts" for actions in respect of damage or loss
attributable to measures they took to enforce pollution regulations
against foreign ships "when such measures are unlawful or exceed those
reasonably required in the light of available information."" It might be
noted that while the provision discussed earlier regarding environmental
injuries requires states to provide for recourse in their courts against
natural or juridical persons," this provision presumably requires a state
to provide for recourse in its courts against itself or its responsible
agency or instrumentality.
77. See id. arts. 58(1), 79, 87, 112, 141.
78. See id. arts. 24,27-28,44, 54, 58,78(2), 92, 97, 110, 111.
79. See id. arts. 106, 110(3), 111(8), 232. The absence of an express provision does not
relieve a state of its responsibility for breaches of the Convention.
80. See id. arts. 110(3), 111(8). Breach of the obligation to compensate the ship would
presumably give rise to a right of the flag state to make a claim as in other cases of uncompen-
sated injury to foreign nationals. That claim would be subject to compulsory arbitration or
adjudication under the Convention.
81. Id. art. 232.
82. See id. art. 235(2).
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IX. INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY INTERESTS AND PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
The Convention contains a detailed article designed to ensure
adequate protection for the ship, crew, and passengers by the flag state
itself. Article 94 requires the flag state to ensure that the ship and its
crew are in compliance with generally accepted international safety
standards, including training standards. The same rule applies to labor
conditions on board, "taking into account applicable international
instruments." Apart from this, one would generallyhave to look outside
the Convention for the human rights obligations of the flag state with
respect to the owner of the ship and with respect to its crew, passengers
and cargo.
A. Limitations on the Exercise of Coastal State Jurisdiction
The most elaborate provisions of the Convention addressing
traditional international human rights concerns are designed to protect
vessels and their crew from states other than the flag state in situations
in which the Convention accords those states legislative or enforcement
authority with respect to foreign ships.
To an important degree, these protections are subject to compul-
sory arbitration or adjudication under the Convention in actions brought
by states. In fact, the need for urgent recourse to an international forum
in the event a ship or individual is detained is one of the reasons that the
Convention created a new standing International Tribunal for the Law
of the Sea. Apart from deep seabed mining questions, states generally
are not required to accept thejurisdiction of that Tribunal: they may opt
for arbitration or for adjudication before the International Court of
Justice instead. 3 However, in urgent situations involving an application
for release of a detained vessel or crew, or a request for provisional
measures pending the constitution of an arbitral tribunal, all the parties
to the Convention are subject to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. 4
The two most dramatic extensions of coastal state enforcement
jurisdiction over foreign ships addressed by the Convention concern
fisheries and pollution from ships. The latter was regarded as particu-
larly sensitive since it applies to ships exercising navigational rights and
freedoms under the Convention. In this connection it should be noted
83. See id. art. 287.
84. See id. arts. 290(5), 292(1).
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that, in additionto coastal state enforcement competence in its (12-mile)
territorial sea and (200-mile) exclusive economic zone, a port state is
accorded universaljurisdictionto arrest and prosecute when a vessel is
"voluntarily" within its port "in respect of any discharge from that
vessel outside the internal waters, territorial sea or exclusive economic
zone of that State in violation of applicable international rules and
standards."85
If not unique, the Convention is certainly remarkable in the
attention it devotes to the human rights consequences of expanding the
bases of jurisdiction. The response includes unusually detailed
provisions designed to protect the rights of the ship owner and the
liberty interests of the crew. These were in significant measure a
response to concerns about the treatment of foreign ships and crew
members by various states, including detention policies, trial practices
and prison conditions in different parts of the world.
With respect to the exercise of enforcement and adjudicative
jurisdiction over foreign ships either by a coastal state for fisheries
violations in its exclusive economic zone or by a coastal state or a port
state for pollution violations by a ship navigating at sea, the Convention
imposes three types of requirements or limitations: 6
* release of the arrested vessel and crew on posting reason-
able bond or other security; 7
* prohibition of imprisonment, corporal punishment, and
other non-monetary penalties;88 and
85. Id. art. 218(1) (emphasis added). It should be noted that as in other cases in which
universal or other extraordinary jurisdiction is authorized by treaty, the offense itself is
internationally defined. This concurrent jurisdiction can be regarded as "complementary" or
"residual" in the sense that it yields to the jurisdiction of a state with greater contacts in certain
circumstances: "No proceedings pursuant to paragraph 1 shall be instituted in respect of a
discharge violation in the internal waters, territorial sea or exclusive economic zone of another
State unless requested by that State, the flag State, or a State damaged or threatened by the
discharge violation, or unless the violation has caused or is likely to cause pollution in the
internal waters, territorial sea or exclusive economic zone of the State instituting the
proceedings." Id. art. 218(2). The jurisdiction of the port state with respect to violations in its
own territorial sea or exclusive economic zone is separately addressed. See id. art. 220(1).
86. These limitations do not apply to the flag state of the ship.
87. Convention, supra note 2, arts. 73(2), 226(1)(b).
88. Id. arts. 73(3), 230(1) & (2).
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* notice to the flag state of arrest, of action taken and of
penalties imposed. 9
The first of these requirements is reinforced by article 292 of the
Convention, a special provision that establishes the jurisdiction over
applications for release of International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
as well as any other tribunal accepted by the detaining state. After ten
days, an application for release may be submitted to the tribunal "by or
on behalf of the flag State of the vessel." The tribunal must deal with
the application "without delay." "Upon the posting of the bond or other
financial security determined by the court or tribunal, the authorities of
the detaining State shall comply promptly with the decision of the court
or tribunal concerning the release of the vessel or its crew."
The stipulation that an application to an international tribunal may
be made not only "by," but alternatively "on behalf of," the flag State
is unique to this provision. The language was a compromise with those
who sought a direct right of access to the tribunal by the vessel owner.
The text is designed to permit the flag state, if it wishes, to authorize an
individual or association, such as the ship owner, a shipping association
or a labor union, to make an application for release. The basic question
is whether the procedures adopted by the International Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea will accord this provision real meaning, and permit the
flag State, if it wishes, to describe in advance by name, class or category
those authorized to make applications for release on its behalf, without
the need to authorize those individuals specifically in each particular
application.9" Unless this is done, the distinction between an action
"by" and "on behalf of' the flag state will become a purely formal one
that, even when that is the wish of the flag state, accords no real
possibility of speedy access to the private party concerned without the
need for a specific authorizing document to be submitted by the
government of the flag state with respect to each particular application.
89. Id. arts. 73(4), 231. Article 27 contains a similar notice requirement with respect to
the exercise of criminal jurisdiction on board a foreign ship in innocent passage through the
territorial sea.
90. There is a legal difference between a signatory and a party. This is basic international
law. While the same question faces the International Court of Justice in principle, all States
Party are subject to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal in vessel release proceedings, while not all
detaining states are likely to have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court. Moreover, unlike the
Tribunal, the Court is subject to a limitation in article 34 of the Statute of the I.C.J., done June
26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 [hereinafter I.C.J. Statute], that permits only states
to be parties in cases before it. This may lead to a more cautious reaction by the Court,
although in principle it is not apparent that permitting advance authorization of applications "on
behalf of" the flag state is necessarily inconsistent with article 34 of the Statute.
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With regard to the penalty limitations, article 73(3) prohibits
"imprisonment, in the absence of agreements to the contrary by the
States concerned, or any other form of corporal punishment" for
violation of coastal state fisheries laws and regulations in the exclusive
economic zone. The position of the reference to corporal punishment
was deliberately chosen so that it would not be qualified by the
reference to agreements to the contrary. The monetary penalty limitation
of article 23 0(1) applies to pollution violations by foreign ships beyond
the territorial sea; the monetary penalty limitation of article 230(2)
applies to such violations within the territorial sea "except in the case of
a wilful and serious act of pollution in the territorial sea."91
The Convention contains a number of other important limitations
on the exercise of jurisdiction with respect to pollution violations by
foreign ships at sea. Many of these are assembled in a special section
entitled "Safeguards. 92 One of the most significant is the rule that, in
exercising their pollution jurisdiction, "States shall not discriminate in
form or in fact against vessels of any other State."93 This does not
prejudice the specific obligations of states to foreign vessels under the
Convention, whether or not those states accord the same treatment to
their own vessels. The key term, of course, is "discriminate against."
Apart from dumping of refuse,94 navigation in ice-covered areas95
and discharges by ships in innocent passage through the territorial sea,96
the coastal state has no unilateral legislative competence over pollution
from foreign ships exercising navigational rights and freedoms at sea;
it is limited to enacting and enforcing international standards97 or
internationally approved special standards.9" Moreover, coastal state
enforcement powers are finely modulated. In the exclusive economic
zone, for example, they range from a right to request information from
91. The reference to "a wilful and serious act of pollution" was drawn from the elaboration
of the meaning of an innocent passage in article 19(2)(h). It also may be noted that a
contractor's rights under a deep seabed mining contract may be suspended or terminated for
"serious, persistent and wilful violations." Convention, supra note 2, ann. III art. 18(1)(a).
92. Id. arts. 223-33.
93. Id. art. 227.
94. See id. art. 210(5).
95. See id. art. 234.
96. See id. arts. 21(1)(f)&(2), 211(4).
97. See id. arts. 21(2), 42(1)(b), 54, 211(5), 218(1).
98. See id. art. 211(6). The Convention permits the coastal state to establish and enforce
its own conditions for port entry and imposes no specific constraint on unilateral coastal state
standards for ships using its ports. See id. arts. 25(2), 211(3).
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a foreign ship if there are "clear grounds" for believing a pollution
violation has occurred, 9 to a right to board and inspect the ship if there
are "clear grounds" for believing a pollution violation "resulting in a
substantial discharge causing or threatening significant pollution of the
marine environment" has occurred,1" to a right to detain the ship and
institute proceedings if there is "clear objective evidence" that the ship
has committed a violation "resulting in a discharge causing major
damage or threat of major damage.""1 ' In addition, there are detailed
provisions designed to ensure that "States shall not delay a foreign
vessel longer than is essential for" the investigative purposes set forth
in the Convention." 2
The right of a state to institute criminal proceedings against a
foreign ship for a pollution violation at sea is limited in a number of
respects. There is a three-yeartime limit on prosecutions for violations
by foreign ships.103 No state is permitted to institute proceedings in
respect of a violation by a foreign ship after another state has instituted
proceedings in respect of the same matter. 4 If the flag state subse-
quently institutes proceedings against its ship, in certain circumstances
the coastal state must suspend its own proceedings. 05
For human rights experts, perhaps the most interesting provision
of the Convention is the following: "In the conduct of proceedings in
respect of [pollution] violations committed by a foreign vessel which
may result in the imposition of penalties, recognized rights of the
accused shall be observed."
10 6
This provision doubtless requires, in addition to the rights set forth
in other provisions of the Convention, the non-discriminatory applica-
tion of all rights of the accused under the laws of the forum state. But
such a result follows in any event from the prohibition on discrimination
against foreign ships. 7 Is that all this means? Does the provision have
independent legal content?
99. See id. art. 221(3).
100. Id. art. 221(5).
101. Id. art. 221(6).
102. Id. art. 226(1)(a).
103. See id. art. 228(2).
104. See id.
105. See id. art. 228(1).
106. Id. art. 230.
107. See id. art. 227.
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The term "recognized rights" implies rights arising from an
external source that become legally effective when recognized. This is
not the most common language used to describe rights arising solely
under municipal law; qualifying words such as "established,"
"described," "protected," or even "enshrined" are far more common.
The term "recognized rights" does, however, resonate with the classic
harmonies of international law: rights arise under international law
when they are recognized by states. The means for recognizing such
rights may include international conventions establishing rules
"expressly recognized" by the states concerned, international custom as
evidence of a general practice "accepted" as law, or the general
principles of law "recognized" by civilized nations. 0
This provision of the Convention should be understood not only
to guarantee non-discriminatory application of the protections for the
accused set forth in municipal law, but also to incorporate by reference
all international human rights obligations binding on the forum state by
virtue of treaty or customary international law. But that having been
said, the question arises: If the forum state is bound in any event to
respect those rights, what is the purpose of adding a special provision
to that effect in the Convention?
One purpose, of course, is to serve as a reminder. Another could
be to influencethe courts or legislatures in those states where the human
rights norms of customary international law or human rights treaties are
not otherwise directly executed by the courts and have not otherwise
been enacted as municipal law. Yet another purpose could be to subject
compliance with the relevant human rights requirements to compulsory
arbitration or adjudication under the Convention.
The last of these raises an interesting issue under the dispute
settlement provisions of the Convention. The context is the duty to
respect recognized rights of the accused in the conduct of proceedings
in respect of pollution violations committed by a foreign vessel at sea.
While in principle all disputes concerning the interpretation or applica-
tion of the Convention are subject to compulsory arbitration or
adjudication,' the question here concerns the limitations and excep-
tions set forth regarding coastal state rights. In particular, to the extent
that the dispute concerns"the exercise by a coastal State of its sovereign
108. This is the classic language on the sources of international obligations contained in
article 38 of the I.C.J. Statute, supra note 90.
109. See Convention, supra note 2, art. 286.
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rights or jurisdiction provided for in this Convention," it would be
necessary to establishthat the case involves an allegation "that a coastal
State has acted in contravention of the provisions of this Convention in
regard to the freedoms and rights of navigation." ' ° The precise issue,
therefore, is whether the provision on respecting the recognized rights
of the accused in proceedings against a foreign ship for a pollution
violation at sea is a provision "in regard to the freedoms and rights of
navigation."
The answer, I believe, is affirmative. All of the elaborate
limitations and safeguards imposed on the jurisdiction of a state to deal
with pollution violations by foreign ships relate to violations committed
by those ships while navigating at sea. Their purpose is to protect and
minimize interference with the navigation rights and freedoms recog-
nized by the Convention by carefully controlling the exceptions they
create to the exclusivejurisdiction of the flag state. All of the enforce-
ment safeguards result from the fact that the enforcement proceedings
themselves affect, and potentially prejudice, the freedoms and rights of
navigation.
This interpretation is reinforced by the fact that the environmental
obligations of the coastal state to respect specified standards are not
excluded from compulsory jurisdiction.1 1 The rational conclusion is
that both the rights and the obligations of the coastal state with respect
to pollution matters are subject to compulsory jurisdiction.
This interpretation is further reinforced by the language of the
optional exception to jurisdiction. A state may, if it wishes, exclude
from compulsory jurisdiction "disputes concerning law enforcement
activities in regard to the exercise of sovereign rights or jurisdiction
excluded from the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal under article 297,
paragraph 2 or 3."'112 Paragraphs 2 and 3 of article 297 deal with
jurisdiction over fisheries and marine scientific research. The intended
result of these precise cross-references is that a state may not exclude
from compulsory jurisdiction disputes concerning law enforcement
activities in regard to the exercise of its jurisdiction over pollution from
ships.
I10. Id. art. 297(I)(a).
111. See id. art 297(1)(c).
112. Id. art. 298(1)(b).
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B. Ships Without Nationality
An interesting problem is posed by ships without nationality that
serves to highlight the relationship between the international law of the
sea and the international law of human rights. The rights and freedoms
of navigation recognized by the Convention are enjoyed by states in
respect of ships of their nationality."' Ships without nationality do not
enjoy those rights or freedoms as such." 4 A ship may be boarded on the
high seas if there is reasonable ground for suspecting that the ship is
without nationality." 5 What then?
Ships operate in an environment in which nationality of the ship
rather than territorial sovereignty is the foundation for the maintenance
of public order. As the law of piracy demonstrates, when no state of
nationality can be identified and deemed responsible, the maintenance
of public order at sea becomes a responsibility shared by all states.
Jurisdictional principles and substantive rules regarding ships without
nationality can be expected to respond in similar fashion to this
underlying public order requirement. Ships are easily registered in a
variety of places. A case of no flag, or multiple flags,1 6 presents a
situation that invites inquiry and control by the authorities of a state.
This may require that state to detain and divert the ship and its crew,
passengers, and cargo.
But ships without nationality are not fair game. Those aboard or
otherwise affected continue to enjoy the protection of laws against
piracy and other criminal and civil laws. There may be no right of
navigation and no requirement to defer to flag state jurisdiction, but an
intervening state must respect the human rights of the individuals
concerned in accordance with applicable treaties and customary
international law. The individual's state of nationality may claim
damages for injuries resulting from violation of those rights. To the
extent that any such claim is founded on rules external to the
113. "The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked." Id. art. 87(1).
"These freedoms [of the high seas] shall be exercised by all States with due regard for the
interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas." Id. art. 87(2). "Every
State, whether coastal or land-locked, has the right to sail ships flying its flag on the high seas."
Id. art. 90.
114. See id.
115. See id. art. lI0(1)(d).
116. A ship which sails under two or more flags, "using them according to convenience,
may not claim any of the nationalities in question with respect to any other State, and may be
assimilated to a ship without nationality." Id. art. 92(2).
[36:399
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE LA W OF THE SEA
Convention, it is not clear however that it would give rise to a dispute
concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention for
purposes of compulsory jurisdiction.
11 7
X. CONCLUSION
It is unlikely that the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, or
the law of the sea more generally, will be accorded a central role in the
history of the international law of human rights. But the foregoing
review suggests that it may be deserving of more than a footnote. How
much more may well depend on the way in which it is implemented in
the years to come and, in that respect, the attention it receives by those
most interested in the development and protection of human rights.
117. See id. art. 286. The principal reason for inferring incorporation mutatis mutandis of
relevant human rights rules into the constituent instrument of an intergovernmental organization
is to ensure that the organization, to the extent that the exercise of powers delegated by states
affects individual rights, respects the same norms that limit the powers of states (and in
particular the member states). Especially where the organization is already subject to judicial
review, such a result also may make more administrative sense than seeking to bind the
organization indirectly by invoking the human rights obligations of each member state. This
reasoning does not appear to be relevant to the question of implied incorporation of rules
external to a treaty where the duties of an international organization or other collective
enterprise are not involved and the issue is whether a dispute between states is subject to the
compulsory jurisdiction of a tribunal because it concerns the interpretation or application of the
treaty.
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